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INTRODUCTION

Background of the Problem
As commercial space transportation demand increases, so will the number of
scheduled launch dates. The aerospace industry is very different from other industries in the
United States of America (USA). According to Wensveen “The combination of technological
uncertainty and long lead times, often 7-10 years and frequently longer, between program
initiation and completion, makes advance estimation of cost particularly difficult” (Wensveen,
2008, p.6). Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) is in the process of shifting
the 20th Century USA vertical launch vehicle, space transportation
manufacturing/assembly/testing/launch paradigm into the lean and cost efficient 21st Century
USA vertical launch vehicle, space manufacturing/assembly/testing/launch paradigm defined
on their website as follows:
In an era when most technology based products follow a path of ever-increasing
capability and reliability while simultaneously reducing costs, launch vehicles today are
little changed from those of 40 years ago. SpaceX aims to change this paradigm by

developing a family of launch vehicles which will ultimately reduce the cost and
increase the reliability of space access by a factor of ten. Coupled with the newly
emerging market for private and commercial space transport, this new model will reignite humanity's efforts to explore and develop Space.
(SpaceX, Company Overview, n.d.)
Future vertical launch spaceport operations teams and customers will need to know the
parameters associated with vertical launch scheduling to properly plan launching from the Cape
Canaveral Spaceport. This includes the mean number of days between initial and actual launch
dates, the mean number of reschedule dates, and the mean number of days between initial and
reschedule dates per mission. There does not appear to be any collective data analysis of this
sort concerning vertical launch schedules from Cape Canaveral Spaceport. Providing analysis,
for the 2008-2009 vertical launches, at this site, will provide a preliminary glimpse of key
factors to spaceport launch operation teams and customers to properly allocate resources and
forecast vertical launch support system supply and demand requirements.

History
The decision to designate Cape Canaveral as the USA‟s vertical launch vehicle
spaceport, for payload and human spaceflight, was made for very specific reasons. This
location offers an eastern launch inclination, a safe distance from populated areas, over the vast
expanse of the Atlantic, placing the hardware far above population‟s harm, and into orbit.
Seller‟s states “ …the benefit of being closer to the equator for equatorial orbits, and the added
velocity from the Earth‟s rotation rate…” (2005, p.614) were the other key factors. Cape
Canaveral was designated as the Air Force‟s Eastern Test Range in 1964. The Mercury and
Gemini missions launch from this site under the control of the
Air Force‟s 45th Space Wing (45th SW). When the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) embarked on the Apollo program, they moved the John F. Kennedy

Space Center (KSC), human spaceflight launch operations, to Merritt Island where they
constructed launch complexes 39A and 39B. The State of Florida/KSC/45th SW, under the
State‟s space agency, created a Spaceport Master Plan for the State, in 2002, and designated the
areas of Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) and KSC as the Cape Canaveral
Spaceport. The State of Florida‟s recently completed Spaceport Master Plan 2010 refers to this
site as the Cape Canaveral Spaceport, as well. This definition serves as the collective
description of spaceport activities within the CCAFS/KSC areas, as the State‟s space
transportation, multimodal system component. The other components are air, sea, rail, and
highway systems. The Cape Canaveral Spaceport is fortunate to have all four systems
strategically tied into their daily activities to support vertical launch activities taking people,
goods, and services outside our atmosphere and beyond. The environment outside our
atmosphere has been our frontier for the last 51 years.
The space launch enterprise has been historically championed by the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the NASA in the USA. The International Space Station‟s (ISS)
requirements concerning re-supplying and ferrying humans to and from the world‟s first space
outpost moved the NASA decision-makers to engage with national commercial space
transportation organizations to perform these functions after the Shuttle program retired. This
program is the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program. CCAFS, under
the umbrella of the 45th SW, is currently engaging with Space Command‟s „Launch Enterprise
Transformation‟ to support future DOD, civil, exploration, and commercial launch efforts from
licensed launch pads on their site.
“Lockheed Martin Commercial Launch Services – Space Launch Complex (SLC) 41,
United Launch Alliance (ULA)- SLC 37, and SpaceX-SLC 40 operate and launch from
CCAFS, and hold Active Launch Licenses from the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA)/Aerospace Transportation (AST). The State of Florida‟s aerospace agency, Space
Florida (SF), has an Active Site Operator License for SLC 46” (U.S. DOT, FAA( n.d.) Active

Licenses) designed to support solid launch vehicle activities, at CCAFS. Though CCAFS is a
DOD site, the need to support commercial space transportation requirements, with regard to
national security, communication, remote sensing, exploration, experimentation, and human
space flight, has been recognized. The utilization of this area for its original purposes is being
understood anew. KSC is restructuring SLC 39B as the Space Launch System launch platform.
SpaceX is retrofitting SLC 39A to support the Falcon9 Heavy Launch platform.
The infancy of nonfederal, contracted, commercial space transportation is at hand.
Future commercial launch transportation interest and demand is increasing. New information
system architecture will need to be created to support the future multi- customer/multi-mission
launch operations. Launch site, facilities processing, and launch operators, along with launch
and payload customers, will need to know the parameters associated with launch scheduling at
Cape Canaveral Spaceport, to properly allocate resources and forecast launch support system
demand requirements.
Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this study is to analyze the Cape Canaveral Spaceport actual
launch schedule dates, delineated as initial, rescheduled, and actual launch dates, tracking only
those mission launches with actual launch dates between January 1, 2008 and December 31,
2009, to identify scheduling parameters for commercial space transportation allocation of
spaceport resources based on the variables identified in the sub problems.
Sub problems
The first sub problem is to estimate the mean number of days between the initial
scheduled launch date and the actual launch date.
The second sub problem is to estimate the mean number of times a launch was
rescheduled per mission.
The third sub problem is to estimate the mean number of days between the scheduled
dates per mission.

The fourth sub problem is to investigate the percentage of planned scheduled launches
vs. actual launches at Cape Canaveral Spaceport.
Assumptions
1. The data taken from the Space Flight Now Launch Log is correct
2. This researcher captured the Space Flight Now Launch Log data correctly
3. The dates used for the analysis are Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) dates
Delimitations
1. The lack of time to gather significant insight or data from the 45th SW, 1Range Operations
(ROPS) Scheduling and the NASA scheduling authorities
2. The time factor required to support new preliminary research
3. This researcher‟s capacity as a novice in this field
4. Lack of consistent time reporting throughout Spaceflight Now Log, some entries did not
specify a specific day, but rather an early or late month entry.
5. The findings and conclusions will be based on an investigation of the variables identified in the
problem statement and sub problems.
6. Unidentified confounding variables may have a negative impact on the findings and
conclusions.
7. Although the research report is free of intentional bias, the researcher recognizes the
probability of bias of some type and cautions the reader to be cognizant of that likelihood.
Definition of Terms
Cape Canaveral Spaceport – Cape Canaveral Air Force Station and Kennedy Space Center sites
Commercial Space Transportation – Launch vehicle and launch operations owned by private
organizations providing services to the NASA, DOD, and other customers with launch
requirements
Launch-Window Sidereal Time (LWST) – “…local sidereal time (LST) for when the launch site is

under the orbital plane (launch time)…Whenever the local sidereal time (at the launch site)
equals the launch-window sidereal time (LST=LWST), the correct geometry exists to launch
the spacecraft into the desired orbit” (Sellers, 2005, p.299).
The Gooch Factor – Retired Col. Gooch‟s determination that 70% of the scheduled launches actual
happen at the Eastern and Western Ranges.
Acronyms
45th SW

45th Space Wing

AST

Aerospace Transportation

CCAFS

Cape Canaveral Air Force Station

COTS

Commercial Orbital Transportation Services

DMS

Delivery Management System

DOD

Department of Defense

DOT

Department of Transportation

DSS

Decision Support Systems

EELV

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FPD

Fast Package Delivery

GEO

Geosynchronous Earth Orbit

ISS

International Space Station

KSC

Kennedy Space Center

LST

Local Sidereal Time

LWST

Launch-Window Sidereal Time NAS

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

National Airspace System

NSRP

National Spacelift Requirements Process

NSRWG

National Spacelift Requirements Working Group

RLV

Reusable Launch Vehicle

ROPS

Range Operations

SATMS

Space and Air Traffic Management System

SLC

Space Launch Complex

SLMP

Space Launch Master Plan

SpaceX

Space Exploration Technologies Corporation

ULA

United Launch Alliance

U.S.

United States

USA

United States of America

U.S. DOT

United States Department of Transportation

REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND RESEARCH
Introduction
This study focused on the vertical launch schedule mean number of days
between scheduled dates and the mean number of schedule dates per mission. CCAFS
oversees diverse launch operations and is the conduit between the NASA and commercial
launch and payload operator providers at the Eastern Range. Range scheduling at CCAFS
coordinates all launch schedule requests and coordinates all launch date rescheduling for Cape
Canaveral Spaceport. Some reasons for launch dates to change include launch system failure,
payload issues, weather, and down range issues ranging from stray sea vessels to aircraft
navigating in the designated airspace. Clearing the three dimensional airspace, the size of the
Eastern Range is a remarkable task.
Managing Resources
Sellers states, “Mission managers and operators must carefully spend scare resources –
time, money, and people – while monitoring the eternal tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and
performance. The schedule critical factor is as follows:
1.

To meet launch window requirements

2.

To meet spacecraft position requirements to serve paying customers The

longer the time factor on the ground, the more additional costs accrue” (2005, p. 365).
Future Aerospace Traffic Management
The FAA is “considering a „Space and Air Traffic Management system (SATMS) that
equitably supports both the evolving commercial space transportation industry and

the mature and continuously growing aviation industry in a systematic, integrated manner.
According to the FAA Aerospace Forecasts: Fiscal Years 2005-2016, this air traffic
management system will include “…the people, infrastructure, policies, procedures, roles and
regulations…under a single infrastructure” (U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), FAA,
Office of Aviation Policy and Plans, p.1). The issues and constraints of rescheduling a launch
three weeks out or at the last minute will be an important part of the management systems
decision support architecture. The U.S. DOT, FAA, Office of Aviation Policy and Plans
specifies, “Launch and reentry plans…and launch/reentry window sizes, as important mission
profile factors that impact the National Airspace System (NAS)” (U.S. DOT, FAA, Office of
Policy and Plans, n.d., p. 10). The necessity to reschedule launches impacts the NAS and needs
to be clearly understood to support future commercial space transportation activities.
Emerging Technologies
Emerging technologies that will support the present and future NAS include the
following:


Conflict Prediction/Resolution



Precise Scheduling Capabilities



Dynamic Airspace Configuration



Enhanced Weather Prediction



Trajectory Modeling



Simulation



Information Exchange/CDM tools



Cockpit display of traffic



Improved CNS



Automation and Displays



Decision Support Systems (DSS) System Performance Analysis Tools (U.S. DOT, FAA, Office
of Policy and Plans, n.d., p.10)
The 2009 Commercial Space Transportation Forecasts report states, “Planners will need fast
time analysis capability and… [operational]… contingency plans” (U.S. DOT, FAA, Office of
Policy and Plans, n.d., p. 13-14).
Humankind is learning about mission planning and scheduling by researching the insect
world around us. Mendham and Clarke, through their research, realized, “In a highly dynamic
environment, plans may quickly become out of date requiring constant rescheduling or
frequent re-planning” (2004, p.1).
Next Generation Spaceports
Brown speaks to, “…spaceports that operate more like airports in support of routine
commercial space transportation (2001, p. 680).” The logistics between launch site operator,
launch vehicle operator/payload owner, spacecraft insertion point, transfer- orbit/s, launch
control operations, and ground station operations is an elaborate schedule engineering feat.
“Range systems must be configured, tested, corrected, adjusted, and retested repeatedly for
every launch, making turnaround time between missions long and expensive, particularly
between missions involving different types of launch vehicles 2001, p. 680)”. (Note: The
Eastern Range (CCAFS) has experience turnaround times between 24-36 hours). Brown
continues with concerns associated with extended delivery dates for “an automated planning
and scheduling system for range facilities (2001, pp. 680-681)” speaking to technology
obsolesce.

After fifty one years of safely supporting the Nation‟s space launch needs, the

national test ranges are confronted with the challenge to rapidly change, to accommodate the
growing commercial launch industry, or face obsolescence.

The U.S. Air Force Space Command through its Range Integrated Product Team, “…
addressed range turnaround times, scheduling systems, modernization programs, and range
modernization (1998, p. 681)”.
Brown expounds on The NextRange™ plan and states “Once complete, orbital traffic
management and eventually interplanetary traffic management will be added (2001, p.682)”.
Delivery of Cargo and People
One of the universal concepts for Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs) concerns
scheduled and on demand delivery of cargo or people. Martin, J., Palmer, K., Chan, M. Karasi,
A., and Glas, D. state, “Looking into the future for schedule and on-demand service requiring
suborbital or orbital delivery, will require a delivery management system/s (DMS) that are
continually updating the launch date and time requirements” (1998, p.1).
Martin, Palmer, et al. address the customer acceptable cost for fast package delivery
(FPD) in relationship to the utility of time. They state, “As with the Fast Package Delivery
System, customer acceptable cost for FPD is dependent on the margin of utility of time (1998,
p. 1).
Time associated with horizontal processing, storage, and scheduling conflicts due to
launch schedule slips or delays can create bottlenecking issues on and off the launch operations
site. This impacts hardware, software, the human factor here on Earth, the point where the
payload will be delivered, and the services it will be performing.
Commercial launch schedule delays may be translated by commercial launch customers
into a punctuality issue. There is a list from airline operations that could prove to be a
beneficial baseline for spaceport operations. Editors Butler and Keller published in the
Handbook of Airline Operations, “The following outlines how to make punctuality a priority in
the turnaround process and how to manage ongoing improvements in punctuality.
1. The biggest punctuality levers are to be found in streamlined communication and a tailor-made
turnaround process.

2. A robust set of decision rules enables punctuality to be pursued realistically.
3. Top management securing the commitment of all concerned parties is imperative.
4. The only way to improve common processes in the future is through the committed teamwork
of all concerned parties.
5. Improved punctuality requires a punctuality manager and an empowered team with the
appropriate mandate.
6. Changing the mind-set and creating effective controls are prerequisites for anchoring improved
punctuality in the organization. (2000, p.330)
Demand and Forecasting
According to the FAA Aerospace Forecasts, Fiscal Years 2005-2016, “…the GEO
forecast also includes a realization factor that estimates the number of launches that will
actually take place during the near-term portion of the model, to take into account the variance
between forecasted demand and actual launches because of satellite and launch vehicle delays”
(U.S. DOT, FAA, Office of Policy and Plans, n.d., p. 1X-7). The factors that affect forecasting
include “satellite manufacturing delays, launch vehicle component problems, launch failure
investigations, manifest issues, regulatory issues, satellite export compliance, FCC licensing,
and changes in the business environment that alter or cancel satellite development plans (U.S.
DOT, FAA, Office of Policy and Plans, n.d., p. 1X-9).
Operationally Responsive Space Components
“The commercial space sector was synergistic with the defense space sector because
both were interested in lower prices and dependable launch schedules (Moorman, 2000, p.8).
The 2004 Assured Access to Space Study, a 1994 Space Launch Master Plan (SLMP) follow
on study, focused on “outlining the milestones, options, and alternatives to improve further the
national security launch posture” (Moorman, 2000, p.8) and included the impact of schedule
slips in the study‟s demand model. The actual number of flight rates is usually less than the
original projections. The study included reliability, resiliency models, delineated Evolved

Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) options, and uncertainty, along with demand. The
complexity associated with each factor, associated with each model, pointed to further analysis
to define future viable options. What was determined was the EELV demand was much less
than previously projected.

What was not discussed was the rise in commercial payload

owners choosing to launch their spacecraft from Russian or Chinese spaceports on foreign
launch vehicles.
Launch Vehicle Management and Mission Planning
Launch vehicle management and mission planning evolve with each new mission
program at the NASA, KSC. The Vehicle Management and Mission Planning System
(VMMPS) proposed during the transitioning from the Apollo to the Shuttle program served as
the system to meet the mission planning function requirements. Pruett and Bell state, “The use
of this system will eliminate much redundancy and re-planning, shorten interface times
between functions, and provide a means to evaluate unplanned events and modify
schedules…flight operations must necessarily interface with all other elements of the program,
methods must be developed to support these functions in an accurate, rapid, and economical
manner…flight operations must be simplified and standardized without compromising mission
success…tools must be developed that preclude the necessity for performing these functions
(where possible) on a per mission basis (1973, p.1).”

Figure 1. Basic VMMPS (Pruett and Bell, (1973) p.2)

Pruett and Bell cite four mission process requirements:
1. Missions should be standardized as much as possible
2. The multiplying effect of mission plan changes must be minimized
3. Organizational interfaces involved in mission design should be reduced
4. The amount of documentation required for each mission should be reduced

Figure 2. Mission Types Composed of One or More Standard Mission Phases Each of
Which Contains Numerous Procedures (Pruett & Bell, (1973) p. 3)

Nichols details a study that included all of the federal government agencies involved with
spacelift in 1994, “The National Spacelift Requirements Process (NSRP) was an attempt to
provide top-level government inter-agency consensus of the Nation‟s spacelift requirements”
(1995, p. 1). As our Nation moves towards maturing commercial space transportation, the
commercial launch vehicle providers together with the DOD and the NASA are redefining
spacelift requirements using higher order technology and tailoring each mission to meet those
requirements.

Schedule Dependability is defined in Nichols‟ paper‟s appendix as “The ability of the
system to consistently launch, and land if required, when planned (1995, p. A-3)”.
The National Spacelift Requirements Working Group developed Figure 3.

Figure 3. Characteristics of the Spacelift Mission (Nichols (1995) p.6)
As illustrated, Schedule Dependability ranks first under the Operable function. Understanding
the mean number of days between initial launch and actual launch and associated reschedule
dates will enhance the Nation‟s vertical launch capability at Cape Canaveral Spaceport to meet
that requirement.

Summary
The mean number of days associated with the initial launch date and the actual
launch date will assist in understanding and architecting future systems that will make launch
turnaround times, resources allocations scheduling, and cost efficiencies and effectiveness a
reality from National spaceports that launch payloads on commercial launch vehicles.
Punctuality, as one of the critical factors in the launch segment of any suborbital/orbital
mission, or beyond, will determine the operational success of our National spaceports.
Statement of the Hypothesis
Based on the review of literature and personal experience, the following four
hypotheses were posited for this study.
Hypothesis 1: The mean number of days between initial launch date and actual launch
date is more than three days.
Hypothesis 2: The mean number of launch scheduled dates to launch is more than
three.
Hypothesis 3: The mean number of days between scheduled dates is more than
three.
Hypothesis 4: The percentage of planned launches vs. actual launches at Cape
Canaveral Spaceport is greater than seventy percent.

RESEARCH METHODS
Research Design
This is a descriptive, quantitative research design based on historical hard data
derived from the scheduled launch dates from the Cape Canaveral Spaceport (as logged by
Spaceflight Now) and includes missions with actual scheduled launch dates within the 2008
and 2009 time frame.
Population
The sample data was derived from missions where the actual scheduled launch
date fell in the 2008 and 2009 time frame. There are some missions that started with an initial
launch date in the 2007 time frame and concluded with a 2008 actual launch date. The
missions beginning with an initial launch date in 2009 without completion of an actual launch
date in 2009 are only included in the planned vs. actual percentage analysis.
Sources of Data
The Spaceflight Now website has capture launch schedule data from 2004 to
present. The mission launch dates culminating in an actual launch in the 2008 and 2009 time
frame were included in the data collected for this research.
Treatment of the Data and Procedures
The hard data was collected from Spaceflight Now website‟s Launch Schedule
Log. The missions were identified as Mission 1, Mission 2…through Mission 24 to keep the
focus on the scheduled launch dates per mission, time in days between scheduled launch dates
per mission, and time in days from initial scheduled launch date to the actual launch date.
Missions 25-27 were used for the planned vs. actual percentage analysis only.
The initial scheduled launch date, reschedule date/s, and the actual launch date were
entered into a Mission/Day Excel spreadsheet sequentially. Then, number of missions that
launched on the initial launch date was visually determined from the Mission/Day spreadsheet.

The remaining data provided the framework to determine the number of days between the
initial and actual launch date and between each rescheduled launch date. The number of
rescheduled launch dates after the initial date and the number of rescheduled launch dates
between the initial and actual launch date were then calculated. The following descriptive
statistics were then calculated based on the sample data. Each of the four calculations
corresponds to one of the sub problems listed in Chapter I.
1. Estimate the mean number of days between the initial launch date and the actual launch date.
2. Estimate the mean number of scheduled dates to launch per mission.
3. Estimate the mean number of days between the scheduled launch dates per mission.
4. Investigate the percentage of planned scheduled launches vs. actual launches at Cape Canaveral
Spaceport
A 95% confidence interval was calculated as a population estimate for descriptive
statistics 1. - 3.
Hypothesis 1 states that the mean number of days between initial launch date and actual
launch is more than three. A test for means, at the 0.05 level of significance, to test the null
hypothesis that the mean number of days between initial scheduled and actual launch dates is
more than three was initially planned. If the null was rejected and the sample mean was
greater than three, the research hypothesis would have been supported.
Hypothesis 2 states the number of scheduled launch dates per mission is greater than
three was planned initially. A test for means, at the 0.05 level of significance, to test the null
hypothesis that the mean number of scheduled launch dates per mission is more than three. If
the null was rejected and the sample mean was greater than three, the research hypothesis
would have been supported.
Hypothesis 3 states that the mean number of days between scheduled launch dates is
more than three. A test for means, at the 0.05 level of significance, to test the null hypothesis
that the mean number of days between each scheduled launch date per mission is more than

three. If the null was rejected and the sample mean was greater than three, the research
hypothesis would have been supported.
Hypothesis 4 states that the percentage of planned launches vs. actual launches at Cape
Canaveral Spaceport is greater than seventy percent. The Gooch Factor (referencing the
percentage of predicted vs. actual launches from CCAFS and Vandenberg Air Force Base)
states, “The actual number of flight rates is usually less than the original predictions…that the
Nation only launches approximately 70 percent what it plans to launch (Moorman, 2006, p. 9).
The number of “projected launch” missions scheduled for 2008 and 2009 (as derived from the
Spaceflight Now Launch log date) versus actual launched missions, and the total number of
launches was calculated. A test of proportions of Mean-One Sample was conducted, at .05
Level of Significance. If the null is rejected, the percentage of missions launched as planned
will be seventy percent or less. If the results fail to reject the null, the evidence will be
sufficient to conclude the planned vs. actual launch percentage is greater than seventy percent
for actual launches within the 2008-2009 timeframe at Cape Canaveral Spaceport.

RESULTS
The following results utilized the Table 1 Data Columns and are derived from the Statdisk
Descriptive Statistical and Confidence Intervals analysis for sub problems 1-3 and Hypothesis
Testing, Proportions One-Mean Sample for sub problem 4.

Table 1. Statdisk Data Columns
MISSION

MEAN
# of Days
Between Initial & Actual

MEAN
# of Days Between
Initial & Rescheduled Dates

MEAN
Number of
Scheduled/Rescheduled Dates Per
Mission

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

133
103
2
319
37
248
58
358
90
129
267
224
279
233
440
61
279
55
53
670
115
4
40
66

17
34
1
64
19
28
15
30
30
22
89
27
47
26
40
12
140
6
27
48
29
4
20
13

8
3
1
5
2
9
4
13
3
7
3
9
6
9
11
5
2
9
2
14
4
0
2
5

Hypothesis 1 and Sub problem 1
Hypothesis 1 states that the mean number of days between initial launch date and actual
launch, or the number of days between scheduled dates, is more than three.

Sample Size, n: 24

Mean:

177.625

St Dev, s:

160.7966

Figure 4. Statdisk Descriptive Statistics Problem 1
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate, see Figure 5. The 95% confidence
interval was (110,245). Therefore, the null is rejected and the population mean is greater than
three, supporting the research hypothesis.

95% Confident the population mean is within the range:
109.7002 < mean <245.4998

Figure 5. Statdisk Confidence Intervals for Number of Days Problem 1

Hypothesis 2 and Sub problem 2
Hypothesis 2 states that the mean number of launch schedule dates is more than three. The
analysis indicates that the mean number of launch schedule dates is 6 dates per mission.

Sample Size, n: 24
Mean:

5.666

St Dev, s:

3.8410

Figure 6. Descriptive Statistics Problem 2
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate, see Figure 7. The 95% confidence
interval was (4, 8). Therefore, the null is rejected and the population mean is greater than three,
supporting the research hypothesis.

95% Confident the population mean is within the range:
4.31095 < mean <7.68905

Figure 7. Confidence Intervals for Number of Days Problem 2

Hypothesis 3 and Sub problem 3
Hypothesis 3 states that the mean number of days between rescheduled dates is more than three.
The analysis indicates that the mean number of days between rescheduled dates is 33 days.

Sample Size, n: 24
Mean:

32.833

St Dev, s:

29.9980

Figure 8. Statdisk Descriptive Statistics Problem 3
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate, see Figure 7. The 95% confidence interval
was (20, 45). Therefore, the null is rejected and the population mean is greater than three,
supporting the research hypothesis.

95% Confident the population mean is within the range:
20.13212 < mean <45.46788

Figure 9 Statdisk Confidence Intervals for Number of Days Problem 3

Hypothesis 4 Sub problem 4
Hypothesis 4 states that the percentage of planned launches vs. actual launches at Cape
Canaveral Spaceport is greater than seventy percent.
The analysis for each year and for the combined years, 2008-2009, result in an eighty-eight
percent (88%) launch rate for missions scheduled in 2008, an eighty-nine percent (89%) launch
rate for missions scheduled in 2009, and an eighty-nine percent (89%) launch rate for missions
with scheduled launches in the 2008-2009 timeframe.

Claim: p > p(hyp)
Sample proportion: 0.8888889
Test Statistic, z: 2.1418
Critical z:

P-Value:

1.6449

0.0161

90% Confidence interval:
0.7894062 < p < 0.9883716
Reject the Null Hypothesis
Sample provides evidence to support the claim

Figure 10. Statdisk Hypothesis Testing, One-Mean Sample Problem 4
Table 2. Planned Versus Actual Launches, 2008-2009
Cape Canaveral Spaceport
Planned vs Actual Launches, 2008-09
30

89%
89%

20
10
0

PLANNED
ACTUAL

88%

2008

2009

TOTAL

PLANNED

8

19

27

ACTUAL

7

17

24

DISCUSSION
The researcher‟s „3 days‟ as a mean value for launch scheduling humans, goods,
and services into orbit or beyond was a civilian, outside-the- launch- scheduling realm was a
„best‟ guess. The 70% Gooch Factor associated with Hypothesis 4 and Sub problem 4 was
referenced from the literature review. To the researcher‟s knowledge this is the first time
research has been conducted on the launch schedule dates at the Cape Canaveral Spaceport.
The reason for this data collection was to determine the existing parameters associated with
launch schedules at both the KSC and the CCAFS to make the proper assessments concerning
scheduling future commercial launch and payload resource allocations.
Hypothesis 1 and Sub problem 1
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate. The data used in the calculation
is summarized in Table 1. The 95% confidence interval is (110, 245). Therefore, the null is
rejected and the sample mean is greater than three, supporting the research hypothesis. The
best estimate was calculated at 178 days. The researcher is 95% confident that the number of
days between an initial and actual launch date is no less than 110 and no more than 245. The
confidence interval for the number of days between the initial and actual launch date (110,245)
is a wide interval because of the large variance (standard deviation). The actual range of is 2670 days. Remember each mission was analyzed only by schedule dates and in days. While
collecting the data, the researcher discerned the variety of timelines had no apparent
commonality.
Hypothesis 2 and Sub problem 2
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate, see Figure 9. The 95%
confidence interval was (4, 8). Therefore, the null is rejected and the population mean is
greater than three, supporting the research hypothesis.
The best estimate was calculated at 6 days. The researcher is 95% confident that the

number of reschedule dates per mission is no less than 4 and no more than 8. The mean of 6
reschedule dates (approximately one week) is approximately 2 times greater than what
Hypothesis I states. The actual range of is 0-14 days. Remember each mission was analyzed
only by schedule dates and in days. While collecting the data, the researcher discerned the
variety of timelines had no apparent commonality.
Hypothesis 3 and Sub problem 3
A 95% confidence level was calculated as an estimate, see Figure 7. The 95%
confidence interval was (20, 45). Therefore, the null is rejected and the population mean is
greater than three, supporting the research hypothesis The analysis indicates that the mean
number of days between rescheduled dates is 33 days.
Hypothesis 4 and Sub problem 4
The Gooch Factor speaks to 70% of predicted launches, actually launching from the
Eastern and Western Ranges in the USA, analyzing a 10 year time frame. Due to the small
sample size of only 2 years at the KSC and CCAFS (Eastern Range) the data is not comparable,
but the 70% percentage was noted as a reference point and used in the Hypothesis 4 and Sub
problem 4. The percentage of predicted launches that actually launched from the Cape
Canaveral Spaceport in 2008 was 88% and in 2009 89%. For the 2008-2009 combined
timeframe the percentage was 89%. The proportions test illustrates the percentage of actual
launches is significantly higher than the Gooch factor of 70%. This researcher is 95%
confident of that conclusion.
CONCLUSIONS
Major conclusions based on this research are the following (by hypothesis):
1. The average number of days between the initial and actual launch dates is between 110 and 245
days.
2. The average number of scheduled launch dates per mission is between 4-8 days.

3. The average number of days between scheduled launch dates per mission is 20-45 days.
4. The percentage of actual launches is higher than the Gooch factor implied. Each hypothesis in
this study was supported by the research analysis using
Descriptive Statistics and Confidence Intervals, Mean-One Sample for Hypothesis 1-3 and
Hypothesis Testing, Proportion – One Sample for Hypothesis 4. The data collection and
statistical analysis results validate the long timelines associated with the aerospace industry and
the iterative nature of launch scheduling/rescheduling at Cape Canaveral Spaceport. Of the 24
missions that launch in the 2008-2009 timeframe, not one mission launched without a
reschedule date.
The mean number of days between the initial scheduled and actual launch dates of 178
days (approximately one half of a year) is a significant factor in that it is approximately 60
times greater than what the research hypothesized, as an outsider to vertical launch scheduling.
The longer timeline validates the unique attributes associated with vertical launch space
transportation. The longest timeline of 670 days to the shortest timeline of 2 days illustrates the
chasm of time between the two extremes. These timeline variations clearly separate vertical
launch vehicle space transportation from traditional modes of transportation.
The mean number of scheduled/rescheduled dates per mission is 6 schedule/reschedule
dates. These numbers are the number of reschedule iterations that should be considered when
planning and creating forecasting models. This data illustrates the number of times all
schedulers could conceivably be required to reschedule a launch. Two of the launches have 0
scheduled dates between the Initial and Actual Date. These numbers are the number of
iterations between the initial launch date and the actual launch date that should be considered
when planning and creating forecasting models. This data illustrates the number of times all
schedulers could conceivably be required to reschedule a launch from shortest to longest case
scenarios, as represented within the 2008-2009 timeframe.

The mean number of days between the initial scheduled launch date and each
subsequent reschedule date per mission is 33 days (approximately a month), with the range of
1-140 days. The mean and range values provide baselines for monthly demand on processing
and storage facilities for launch vehicles stages and payloads, as well as launch pad
coordination for pads serving multiple launch vehicle customers.
The planned vs. actual launch percentage results of greater than 70% indicate a positive
trend, eighty-nine percent (89%) for all actual launches from Cape Canaveral Spaceport within
the 2008-2009 time frame.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This research is only the beginning of constructive research focused on determining the
function of launch scheduling for commercial space transportation. Similar to aviation moving
from government control to commercial control (with government law, rules and regulation,
and oversight) commercial space launch research is wide open. Someone should conduct
similar research using the KSC and CCAFS historical data for launch scheduling. This
research showed commercial launch and payload customers should expect reschedule dates
between the initial and actual launch dates.
Reschedule dates are to be expected and crews and effected operation schedulers
should build in flex-time to compensate for other contracted mission reschedule dates.
Spaceport operations teams, resource allocations schedulers, and spectators need to plan
accordingly. Cost research could drive innovative spaceport processes development. Space
transportation should not be thought of in the same sense as Earth modes of transportation.
Multimodal hub interface research to support future planning costs, collaborative
modernization and enhancement of existing infrastructure, air traffic control scheduling and
costs, highway traffic impact, shipping traffic scheduling and costs, geophysical impacts to
launch scheduling, and researching the feasibility of a multi-governmental agency decision
management system to support in coordinating all national launch activities should be

considered. There are many opportunities for further research concerning the scheduling of
space transportation launching from the Cape Canaveral Spaceport. No other location on Earth
has the diversity of legacy launch vehicles and payloads, with supporting infrastructure and
trained personnel. When the next solar storm hits the Earth‟s assets in space, there could be a
marked increase in launch and payload demand. Future research should be conducted
addressing the optimal launch scheduling capacity employing the current assets at the Cape
Canaveral Spaceport and how that capacity could be increased to meet the demand for payload
delivery to re-establish space technology services. The scheduling of human spaceflight, goods
and services to support commercial requirements versus the NASA and DoD requirements
opens many avenues for future research as well.
This research could be utilized as a baseline for future research to determine what
direction launch scheduling at the Cape Canaveral Spaceport is headed. But for now, the
results can be used to inform customers and forecast future scheduling parameters, to keep the
costs of operating launch pads, payload processing facilities, crews, and supporting activities in
check, maximize resource allocations.
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